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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JEANNA M. DALLEY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER; IHC HOSPITALS, INC., 
dba UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER; HOWARD R. 
FRANCIS, M.D.; KENT R. 
GAMMETT, M.D.; PROVO 
OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 
CLINIC; and JAMES P. 
SOUTHWICK, M.D., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 880360 
Category 14b 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint on the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Order of dismis-
sal was entered on August 18, 1988. (R. 223-25.) This is an 
appeal as of right from that ruling. Plaintiff filed her notice 
of appeal on August 30, 1988. (R. 228-29.) This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1987). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Is it within the common knowledge of laymen that a 
patient undergoing an elective cesarian section operation does 
not become seriously burned on her lower right leg during the 
course of the operation in the absence of negligence? 
2. Where several defendants jointly operate on a patient 
and control all aspects of the operation, and where the patient 
is burned by an unknown instrumentality during the course of the 
operation, may all of the defendants be held liable for the 
resulting injuries? 
3. May a patient who has suffered a physical injury also 
recover for the resulting mental trauma? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
This is a medical malpractice action for physical and 
mental injuries suffered by plaintiff as a result of the 
defendants• negligence• 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Plaintiff filed her complaint on January 28, 1987, seeking 
recovery for injuries resulting from defendants1 negligence 
during surgery which occurred on February 5, 1985. (R. 1-3.) 
Defendant Southwick filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 
18, 1988. (R. 69-71.) Defendants Francis, Gammett, and Provo 
Obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment; or, in the Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment 
on May 23, 1988. (R. 100-02.) The hospital defendants filed 
their Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants' [sic] Utah 
Valley Regional Medical Center and IHC Hospitals, Inc. on June 
10, 1988. (R. 160-62.) Each of the motions for summary judgment 
asserted that plaintiff could not prevail on her medical 
malpractice claim without an expert witness on the issue of 
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negligence, and also that the claims for emotional injury were 
not recognized in Utah, 
On June 14, 1988, plaintiff filed a Motion in Limine 
seeking a determination that "a person who enters a hospital 
operating room for the purpose of a cesarean section does not 
emerge therefrom with a full thickness burn on the lower right 
leg without someone being negligent." (R. 172-73.) 
All of the motions were argued before the trial court on 
July 22, 1988. (R. 232-33.) On August 1, 1988, the trial court 
issued its ruling granting the defendants' motions for summary 
judgment. (R. 219-21; copy attached in Appendix "A".) A formal 
Order granting the defendants' motions and denying plaintiff's 
Motion in Limine was entered on August 18, 1988. (R. 22 3-25; 
copy attached in Appendix "B".) Plaintiff filed her Notice of 
Appeal on August 30, 1988. (R. 228-29.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
On February 5, 1985, plaintiff underwent an elective 
cesarean section operation at Utah Valley Regional Medical 
Center. (R. 2 para. 4-5; R. 17 para. 3-4; R. 30 para. 4-5; R. 35 
para. 1, 3.) Her attending physician was Dr. Francis (Depo-
sition of Jeanna M. Dalley (R. 239) ("Dalley Deposition") at 
page 9) , and he was assisted by Dr. Gammett and some nurses. 
(Dalley Deposition at 10.) Dr. Southwick was the anesthesi-
ologist. (R. 85, 73.) 
During the course of the operation, a burning smell became 
apparent in the operating room, and at least two nurses asked 
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"whatfs burning.11 (Deposition of Terry Peebles (R. 241) 
("Peebles Deposition") at 9, 17.; Deposition of Kimberly 
Gallagher (R. 240)("Gallagher Deposition") at 12.) After the 
surgery and while still in the operating room, it was discovered 
that plaintiff had two black burns on her lower right leg, one 
about the size of a dime, the other about the size of a half-
dollar. (Dalley Deposition at 19; Peebles Deposition at 12; 
Gallagher Deposition at 11-12.) The sores had not been present 
immediately before the surgery. (Gallagher Deposition at 7; see 
also Dalley Deposition at 22, 25, 46.) 
Dr. Francis examined the sores while plaintiff was in the 
hospital and said they appeared to be burns. (Dalley Deposition 
at 24.) Dr. Gammett examined the sores a few days after the 
operation and stated that they were not normal. (Dalley Deposi-
tion 21-22.) Several nurses also examined the sores. (Dalley 
Deposition at 23.) None of the nurses or doctors prescribed any 
treatment for the sores. (Dalley Deposition at 28-29.) 
Although the smaller sore healed itself, the larger sore 
broke open and appeared blistered. (Dalley Deposition at 28.) 
Skin grafts were eventually required on the larger sore (id.), 
which are resulted in scaring at the site of the donor skin. (R. 
31.) Plaintiff also suffered significant emotional injuries as 
a result of the physical injuries and the defendants1 treatment 
of her. (Dalley Deposition at 31-32.) Plaintiff commenced this 
action to recover for those injuries. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
While expert testimony is generally required in a medical 
malpractice case to establish the standard of care and a breach 
thereof, an exception to that rule exists where the propriety of 
the treatment received is within the common knowledge and 
experience of laymen. It is within the common knowledge and 
experience of laymen that a person does not receive a burn to 
her lower leg during a routine cesarean section operation unless 
someone was negligent. Expert testimony on this issue was not 
required. Plaintiff was entitled to rely on the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur, even though there were multiple defendants. 
Subsequent to the trial court's dismissal of this action, 
this Court has recognized a cause of action to recover for 
negligently inflicted emotional injury. The trial court's 
dismissal of plaintiff's claims for emotional injury was error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH 
THAT A BURN TO AN UNRELATED PART OF THE BODY DURING 
AN OPERATION DOES NOT OCCUR WITHOUT NEGLIGENCE. 
The nature of medical treatment is such that it is beyond 
the understanding and knowledge of the average citizen. 
Unfavorable results can occur even where the best of care was 
given. As a general rule, therefore, expert testimony is 
required in a medical malpractice case to establish whether the 
defendants breached the applicable standard of care. Marsh v. 
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Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959), overruled on 
other grounds, Swan v. Lamb. 584 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 
Certain exceptions to this general rule have been 
recognized: 
[0]rdinarily, expert testimony is necessary 
as to the standard of skill and care 
required of a physician because that is 
usually outside the knowledge and experience 
of lay persons. However, there is a well-
recognized exception to that rule: when the 
impropriety of treatment complained of is of 
such a nature that lay persons could judge 
from common knowledge and experience that 
such an injury would not happen if there had 
been proper skill and care, expert testimony 
is not necessary. 
Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270, 1271 (Utah 1980)(citing Prosser, 
Law of Torts, sec. 39 (4th ed. 1971), other citations omitted). 
See also Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980). 
The opinions in Kim and Nixdorf state that a typical 
example of injuries within the exception to the rule is where 
medical supplies or equipment is left in the patient. The 
opinions do not, however, limit the exception to only forgotten 
instrument cases. Prosser, cited in Kim, gives other examples 
of cases within the exception to the rule as follows: 
When an operation leaves a sponge or 
implement in the patient's interior, or 
removes or injures an inappropriate part of 
his anatomy, or when a tooth is dropped down 
his windpipe, or the patient suffers a 
serious burn from a hot water bottle, or 
when instruments are not sterilized, the 
thing speaks for itself without the aid of 
any expertfs advice. 
W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on 
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the Law of Torts § 39 at p. 256-57 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasis 
added, footnotes omitted). 
For example, in Schaffner v. Cumberland County Hospital 
System, Inc., 77 N.C. App. 689, 336 S.E.2d 116 (1985), review 
denied, 316 N.C. 195, 341 S.E.2d 578 (1986), the patient's right 
hand was burned during ear surgery, apparently by sparks from a 
malfunctioning machine used to cauterize blood vessels. The 
plaintiff did not present any expert testimony to establish that 
the burn was a result of negligence. The court stated: 
While undoubtedly risks are inherent in the 
medical treatment plaintiff received, a 
jury, based on common knowledge and ex-
perience, could reasonably conclude that a 
burn on a portion of her body not involved 
in the surgery was not among those risks, 
and that, but for the negligence of some 
person(s) in control of her person and the 
instrumentalities used in her treatment, she 
would not have been injured. 
Id. at 118-19. 
Similarly, in Wiles v. Myerly, 210 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 1973), 
the plaintiff suffered burns on his buttocks following vascular 
surgery. The Court stated: 
Common knowledge and experience teach 
us that in the ordinary course of events one 
undergoing surgery does not sustain an 
unusual injury to a healthy part of his body 
not within the area of the operation in the 
absence of negligence. 
Id. at 626. See also Beaudoin v. Watertown Memorial Hospital, 
32 Wis.2d 132, 145 N.W.2d 166, 169 (1966)(burn to buttocks 
during a D & C operation) ; Hill v. Highland Hospital, 530 
N.Y.S.2d 381 (App. Div. 1988)(anesthesiologist may be held 
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liable under res ipsa loquitur); Carranza v. Tucson Medical 
Center, 135 Ariz. 490, 662 P.2d 455 (Ct. App. 1983)(burn on leg 
following heart surgery). 
In the instant case, it is also within the common knowledge 
of man that a patient does not develop serious burns on the 
lower leg during a cesarean section operation, unless someone 
has been negligent. Plaintiff was entitled to rely on the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
POINT II 
RES IPSA LOQUITUR MAY BE APPLIED 
AGAINST MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS. 
The defendants claimed before the trial court that plain-
tiff could not recover absent proof specifically linking her 
injuries to a particular defendant. The inability to provide 
such proof, however, is one of the very reasons for the exist-
ence of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The majority of courts 
addressing the issue have held that res ipsa loquitur may be 
applied to invoke an inference of negligence against multiple 
defendants. Schaffner v. Cumberland County Hospital System, 
Inc. , 77 N.C. App. 689, 336 S.E.2d 116, 120-21 (1985), review 
denied, 316 N.C. 195, 341 S.E.2d 578 (1986)(citations omitted). 
The dictum in Talbot v. Dr. W. H. Groves' Latter-day Saints 
Hospital, Inc. , 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872, 874 (1968), cited 
by the defendants to the trial court, does not establish a 
contrary rule. The plaintiff in that case was under the care of 
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the various defendants at different times, which was a critical 
factor in the Court's decision: 
In this case the plaintiff asks the court to 
extend the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to 
a situation where a number of people had 
control or partial control of the plaintiff 
during surgery and thereafter, and where his 
injury may have occurred by the act or 
omission of any one of them, and outside the 
observation of the others. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, in contrast, plaintiff's injury 
occurred in the operating room, and each of the defendants was 
present at the time it occurred. The application of res ipsa 
loquitur is proper under such circumstances. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER FOR EMOTIONAL INJURIES. 
Defendants moved for summary judgment against plaintiff's 
claims for emotional injury on the ground that such claims were 
barred by Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982). In Johnson 
v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988), the Court reexamined the 
issue of recovery for negligently inflicted emotional injuries, 
and abandoned the anachronistic rule of Reiser. Plaintiff 
stated a valid claim for emotional injuries, and should be 
allowed to present that claim to a jury. 
CONCLUSION 
It is within the common knowledge and understanding of 
laymen that a patient does not suffer a burn to a remote portion 
of her body during a cesarean section operation unless someone 
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was negligent. Plaintiff was entitled to rely on the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur to raise an inference of negligence. 
The trial courtfs Order of dismissal should be reversed, 
and the case remanded with instructions to grant plaintiff's 
Motion in Limine. 
DATED this 2-*?i^- day of December, 1988. 
S. REX LEWIS and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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Rul ing (R. 219-21) 
ES3 AUG yn v- & 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY., STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
JEANNA M. DALLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL 
HOSPITAL, et al. , 
Defendants. 
Case Number:CV 87-206 
RULING 
******** 
This matter is before the court on defendants1 motions 
for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes the motions, and all 
parties have filed memo of points and authorities in support of 
their respective positions. The court having carefully considered 
the motions and the accompanying memo, and having heard oral 
argument, now enters its: 
RULING 
Defendants1 motions for summary judgment are well taken 
and are hereby granted. 
The motions are based on two grounds: First the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply here; second, there 
is no cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. 
0 1 0 
To apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur requires the 
establishment of evidentiary foundation. The elements of the 
evidentiary foundation are: (1) the accident was of a kind which, 
in the ordinary course of events, would not have happened had the 
defendant(s) used due care, (2) the instrument or thing causing 
the injury was at the time of the accident under the management 
and control of the defendant(s), and (3) the accident happened 
irrespective of any participation at the time by plaintiff. 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 352-53 (Utah 1980). It is undisputed 
that plaintiff, nor defendant(s), cannot identify the offending 
instrumentality to say nothing of management or control thereof. 
In addition, in medical malpractice cases, plaintiff 
is required to produce expert medical testimony, except in 
exceptional cases (of which this may be one if an instrumentality 
could be found) to establish that the outcome was more likely the 
result of negligence than some other cause. Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Care Inc., 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987). 
Here, plaintiff has failed to establish sufficient 
foundation for the application of res ipsa loquitur, and has 
failed to produce expert medical testimony, and since this is not 
an exceptional case, res ipsa loquitur does not apply. Even 
assuming the jury would infer negligence by some body, if they 
believe that plaintiff had no burn when she arrived at the 
hospital, the failure to show what instrumentality caused the 
burn, and which defendant(s) controlled that instrumentality 
would still leave us without any specific culpable party or 
parties. Therefore, the application of res ipsa loquitur in this 
matter is inappropriate. 
The failure to show what caused the injury also 
precludes maintaining an action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, defendants' motions 
for summary judgment are hereby granted. 
DATED in Provo, Utah thisjT day of August, 1988. 
APPENDIX "B" 
Order (R. 223-25) 
F ! L £ W COUBT 
IS33AUG18 PH»2MT 
Charles W. Dahlquist (0798) 
Sherene T. Dillon (4820) 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center and 
IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba 
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JEANNA M. DALLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC. 
dba UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER, HOWARD R. 
FRANCIS, M.D., KENT R. 
GAMMETTE, M.D., PROVO OBSTETRICS 
AND GYNECOLOGY CLINIC, and JAMES 
P. SOUTHWICK, M.D., 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 87-206 
Judge George E. Ballif 
The defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and the 
plaintiff's Motion in Limine having come on for hearing before 
the Honorable George E. Ballif, the plaintiff being represented 
by S. Rex Lewis; defendant James P. Southwick, M.D. being 
represented by attorney Elizabeth King Brennan; defendants Dr. 
Howard R. Francis, M.D. and Kent R. Gammette, M.D. and Provo 
Obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic being represented by William W. 
Barrett; and defendants Utah Valley Regional Medical Center and 
IHC Hospitals, Inc. being represented by Charles W. Dahlquist, 
II, the Court having heard full argument on the motions pending 
and, in addition, having reviewed, in camera, the records of a 
subsequent patient at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center whom 
the plaintiff had claimed received a burn on the leg in a 
similar manner, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, pursuant 
to the Ruling of the Court dated August 1, 1988, the Motions for 
Summary Judgment of each of the defendants is hereby granted, 
the plaintiff's Motion in Limine is denied, and this matter is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice as to all defendants, the 
parties to bear their own respective costs. 
DATED this 11> ' * day of August, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
JEORGE^ BALL IF 
D i s t r i c t Judge / 
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